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Abstract—Though recent advancements in DC microgrids
are largely based on distributed control strategies to enhance
reliability, their susceptibility to cyber attacks still remains
a challenging issue. Additionally in converter-dominated DC
microgrids, mitigation of cyber attacks upon detection in a
timely manner is the need of the hour to prevent the system
from immediate shutdown. Since most of the existing research
is primarily focused on detection of cyber attacks in DC mi-
crogrids without giving prior attention to comprehensive steps
of mitigation, this paper classifies cyber attacks as events and
introduces an event-driven cyber attack resilient strategy for DC
microgrids, which immediately replaces the attacked signal with
a trusted event-driven signal constructed using True transmitted
measurements. This mechanism not only disengages the attack
element from the control system, but also replaces it with an
event-triggered estimated value to encompass normal consensus
operation during both steady-state as well as transient conditions
even in the presence of attacks. Finally, the event detection
criteria and its sensitivity is theoretically verified and validated
using simulation and experimental conditions in the presence of
both stealth voltage and current attacks.
Index Terms—DC microgrid, cyber attacks, distributed con-
trol, cyber-physical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE rapid development of DC microgrids can be ascribedto their high flexibility in integrating renewable energy
sources, storage devices and modern electronic loads, in both
grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation [1]. In
this regard, distributed control structures have been trending
for microgrids as they facilitate scalability, reliability and
automation in contrast to the centralized controllers, which are
highly vulnerable to single-point-of-failure [2]. Moreover, they
ensure robust performance under cyber imperfections such as
communication delays, link failures and data packet losses [3].
However, this coordination philosophy can not be designated
to be fully reliable owing to the availability of information
of only neighboring units. This increases the vulnerability
of microgrids to illegitimate sensors and actuators tampering
in the form of cyber attacks [4]. As microgrids are a key
component of mission critical applications such as military
bases, hospitals and industrial plants [5], it is crucial to ensure
their security against adversial attacks.
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To detect the presence of cyber attacks, bad-data detection
tests are usually performed to identify residual element(s)
between estimated and measured states [6]. These attacks can
be classified differently into a primary superset with false
data injection attacks (FDIAs) [7], denial of service (DoS)
[8] and replay attacks as its elements [9]. These are some of
the prominent attacks that has precipitated in real-time ap-
plications. More details on other critical intrusion approaches,
which are the subsets of the conventional attacks, can be found
in [11]. Further, these attacks can also be coordinated, where
the attacker attains sufficient knowledge about the cyber-
physical architecture to create attack vectors, which can easily
bypass the abovementioned bad-data detection tests [12]. Such
attacks are commonly termed as stealth attacks [13]. In other
words, these attacks introduce zero dynamics in distributed
control systems, which goes unnoticeable. The attacker can
use this discreet behavior to collect more system information
by penetrating into the control system at first, and then attack
microgrids to cause instability later in unforeseeable ways.
Hence, accuracy in detection and mitigation of stealth attacks
in a timely manner in distributed DC microgrids remain
a primary concern. Specifically in power electronics based
systems, the mitigating action needs to be fast, otherwise the
network can become unstable or even lead to shutdown.
Considerable efforts have been put recently in modeling and
detection of stealth cyber attacks on various elements (sensors,
communication links) in DC microgrids [14], [15]. Further
studies on differentiating between sensor faults and cyber
attacks is carried out in [16]. However, these papers are limited
to detection without providing any comprehensive steps of
countermeasures for normal system operation to remove the
attack element(s). Additionally, the information received from
the attacked unit(s) is discarded as an elementary approach to
prevent the propagation of attack into the system [17]. As a
result, the network connectivity is affected, which leads to
disruption in the consensus theory. In [18], O. Beg et. al.
have proposed an attack impact quantification technique and
suppressed the impact of attack element using a deterministic
number in the low-pass filter. However, the scalability of the
mitigation approach is not largely discussed. Another well-
defined mitigation approach is to employ an observer for
each unit to operate with the estimated states using the pre-
attack points upon detection of attack [19]. Even though
these approaches are quite efficient, they have model-intensive
requirements, where their performance is highly prone to
model uncertainities. Moreover, the design of observer can
be complex, while its real-time execution may require heavy
computational resources. Additionally, an upper bound based
mitigation condition is also proposed in [20] where the mit-
igation strategy is selectively determined based on the total
number of compromised units, termed as F -total, or the local
compromised agents in the neighborhood of each unit, termed
as F -local. Although it counteracts against attacks on sensors,
actuators and communication links, it might affect the cyber
graph connectivity by unneccesarily abandoning neighbor’s
information during a load change even when there is no
attack. As a result, its operation becomes a point of serious
concern for stealth attacks, which entails zero dynamics in
distributed networks. Further in [21], a cooperative trust and
confidence factor based resiliency algorithm is proposed for
DC microgrids to mitigate the false data immediately by
adaptively changing the communication weights. However, the
online calculation of these factors, which involves additional
layers of integration and division operations, assigns high
computational burden. Moreover to provide attack-resilient
operation, it requires a minimum of half of the neighboring
converters to be trustworthy, thereby limiting its resilience
capability for worst-case attacks. Hence, since the abovemen-
tioned approaches are based on restrictive assumption on the
information exchange in the cyber network, a self-healing
mitigation strategy needs to be developed, which provides
maximum resilience for the system to recover without losing
the cyber network connectivity.
To address these issues, this paper proposes an event-
driven cyber attack resilient strategy for DC microgrids for
the first time, where only the presence of a cyber attack
element in a given agent is classified as an event. As compared
to the conventional event-triggered schemes [22]-[23], attack
detection criterion are used as triggering mechanisms for the
proposed countermeasures to operate immediately [24]-[25].
As already discussed in [14], [15], since stealth attacks involve
compromised sensors, actuators and communication links,
activation of these events is defined using the detection criteria
for each unit. Further, the activation status of these events
in the attacked agent is also transmitted to non-compromised
neighbors to authenticate the transmitted measurements as
False. Since the cyber and control layers are closely coupled,
this action firstly ensures that the attacked measurement is
discarded locally and in the neighboring agents. Secondly,
as long as the events are activated in the attacked unit, an
event-triggered signal is constructed using the measurement(s)
of trusted neighbors (with authentication signal labeled as
True). The signal reconstruction is done by using detec-
tion criteria as triggering mechanism to operate within pre-
specified thresholds. Unlike observers, the proposed mecha-
nism doesn’t involve any integration operation to remove the
attack elements, thereby making it computationally viable. By
doing so, it is ensured that the system continues to operate
normally during both steady-state and transient conditions.
Finally, different avenues of system operation are discussed
in detail corresponding to the severity of stealth attacks on
both voltage and current measurements in DC microgrids. To
establish the convergence between the event-driven resilient
signal and time-triggered signal(s), a theoretical analysis is
also carried out to establish that the system could operate with
N − 1 event-driven resilient signals under worst-case attack
scenarios. As opposed to the existing resilient schemes, the
proposed strategy offers N − 1 and full scale of resilience for
stealth attacks on currents and voltages in a DC microgrid
comprising of N converters, respectively. Furthermore, no
model-intensive design requirements and flexibility to operate
without disabling the compromised cyber links are additional
advantages of the propsed approach, which showcases a new
norm of resiliency of cooperative microgrids against cyber
attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
depicts a brief overview of the cyber-physical architecture
of DC microgrids alongwith a basic overhaul of distributed
secondary control objectives and performance of conventional
event-triggered theory in the presence of stealth attacks. Next,
a comprehensive resilience framework alongwith signal recon-
struction via triggering criterion for stealth attacks is provided
in Section III. Section IV provides a convergence analysis
of the event-driven resilient signals with the periodic time-
triggered authenticated measurements from the neighbors to
study the feasibility of the proposed approach. Simulations
along with experimental validation are presented in Section
V and VI, respectively. A brief on the main features and
advantages of the proposed approach is added to Section VII.
Finally, Section VIII provides the concluding remarks and
future scope of this work.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF STEALTH ATTACKS IN
COOPERATIVE DC MICROGRIDS
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Fig. 1. Generic cyber-physical model of DC microgrid with N agents: Blue
arrows represent the cyber layer and black lines represent the physical circuit.
Further, red lines represent the attacked component(s) in the cyber-physical
DC microgrid.
A. Preliminaries of Conventional Cooperative Control in DC
Microgrids
An exemplary autonomous DC microgrid considered in this
work is shown in Fig. 1. N DC sources connected via DC/DC
buck converters of equal power rating are interconnected to
each other via tie-lines forming the physical layer of the
microgrid. Each converter is operated in voltage controlled
mode. Cooperative secondary controllers are employed to
improve current sharing performance and voltage regulation of
these sources [26]. These controllers are made possible using
a distributed communication layer, which shares information
only between the neighboring units. Each unit, represented
as an agent in the cyber layer, sends and receives xj =
{V̄dcj , I
pu
dcj
} from the neighboring agent(s) to achieve sec-
ondary control objectives namely, average voltage regulation
and proportionate current sharing, where V̄dcj and I
pu
dcj
denote
the average voltage estimate and per unit output current of the
neighboring agents, respectively.
Each agent is represented via a node and a communication
digraph is represented via edges. They constitute an adjacency
matrix A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N , where the communication
weights are given by: aij > 0, if (ψi, ψj) ε E, where E is
an edge connecting two nodes, with ψi and ψj being the
local and neighboring node, respectively. Otherwise, aij = 0.
Further, the incoming cyber information matrix can be denoted
by Zin =
∑
i∈N aij . Hence, if A and Zin match each other,
the Laplacian matrix L is balanced, where L = Zin − A.
Using the preliminaries of the communication graph, the
local control input of the cooperative secondary controller can
be written as:
ui(t) =
∑
jεMi
aij(xj(t)− xi(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ei(t)
(1)
where ui = {uVi , uIi }, ei = {eVi , eIi } respectively as per the
elements in x and Mi is the set of neighbors of ith agent.
Remark I: As per the synchronization law [27], all the agents
participating in distributed control will achieve consensus
using ẋ = −Lx for a well-spanned Laplacian matrix L such
that lim
t→∞
xi(t) = c, ∀ i ∈ N , where c is the steady-state
reference and N is the number of agents.
Using (1), the control inputs to achieve average voltage
regulation and proportionate current sharing can be obtained
from secondary sublayer I and II respectively by using the
following voltage correction terms for ith agent:
Sublayer I: ∆V1i = H1(s)(Vdcref − V̄dci) (2)
Sublayer II: ∆V2i = H2(s)(Idcref − uIi ) (3)
where V̄dci = Vdci +
∫ τ
0
∑
i∈Mi(u
V
i dτ), while H1(s), H2(s)
are PI controllers. Further, Vdcref & Idcref are the global
reference voltage and current quantities for all the agents,
respectively. It should be noted that Idcref = 0 for proportion-
ate current sharing between the agents. The correction terms
obtained in (2)-(3) are finally added to the global reference
voltage to achieve local voltage references for ith agent using:
V idcref = Vdcref + ∆V1i + ∆V2i . (4)
Using (4) as the local voltage reference for ith agent, the
abovementioned secondary objectives are achieved.
Using the distributed consensus algorithm for a well con-
nected cyber graph in a DC microgrid, the system objectives
for DC microgrids using (1)-(4) shall converge to:
lim
t→∞
vi(t) = Vdcref , limt→∞
uIi (t) = 0 ∀i ε N (5)
where vi(t) = Vdci(t) +
∫
j ε Mi
uVi (t) with Vdci denoting the
measured output voltage of ith agent.
Fig. 2. Stealth attacks in DC microgrid with N = 4 agents on average voltage
control inputs [14] of unit I and III at t = 1 sec and, current sensor and
outgoing communication link [15] of unit II at t = 1 sec with attack II around
t = 5 sec – Conventional event-triggered philosophy [22] can not discriminate
between a load change and stealth attack since the objectives in (5) are met
satisfactorily.
TABLE I
STEALTH ATTACKS IN DC MICROGRIDS IN [14] AND [15]
Affected Counterparts Modeling
Voltage [14] WxVattack = 0
Current [15] WxIattack = 0
B. Modeling of Stealth Attacks in DC Microgrids
As shown in Fig. 1, cyber attackers may inject unknown
exogeneous signals in many ways such as, injection of false
data into the controllers, sensors, communication links, etc.
to disrupt the system objectives in (5). These attacks can
be conducted in a coordinated manner to deceive the system
operator in the presence of any such attack elements using the
following modified inputs in (1), given by:
ua(t) = Lx(t) + Wxattack (6)
where ua, x and xattack denote the vector representation of
the attacked control input uai = {uV ai , uIai }, the states and the
attack elements xattacki = [x
V
attacki
, xIattacki ]
T , respectively.
Further, W = [wij] denotes a row-stochastic matrix with its
elements given by:
wij =

1
Mi+1
, j ∈Mi
1−
∑
jεMi
wij , j = i
0, j 6∈Mi, j 6= i
(7)
It should be further noted that xattack is bounded, such that the
protection measures for the DC/DC converter do not operate
as soon as the following holds true:
Vdcmin < Vdc < Vdcmax (8)
Idcmin < Idc < Idcmax (9)
where Idcmin , Idcmax , Vdcmin and Vdcmax denote the vector
representation of minimum and maximum threshold for output
current, minimum and maximum threshold for output voltages.
Remark II: Using the lemma of consensus in [27] despite of
any initial conditions of x(0), it can be concluded that the
solution achieved for:
lim
t→∞
vai (t) = Vdcref , limt→∞
uIai (t) = 0 ∀i ε N (10)
with vai = Vdci(t) +
∫
jεMi
uV ai (t), is feasible and stable. As
a result, these attacks are termed as stealth attacks owing to
identical convergence properties as in (5) even under the pres-
ence of attack elements. Hence, detection and mitigation of
stealth attacks in a distributed network is an important aspect
to prevent the system from further instability or shutdown.
A brief overview of the modeling of these attacks in DC
microgrids is provided in Table I.
Recently, event-triggered algorithms have been devised for
DC microgrids to reduce the communication burden by esti-
mating the desired states locally without use of communication
[22]-[23]. However in the presence of external disturbances
(categorized as events), the gradient projection algorithm used
in [22] ensures that each control input remain within the bound
by triggering the communication layer. However, stealth cyber
attacks can not be detected using the abovementioned event-
triggered algorithms since it exhibits zero dynamics without
affecting the system states. This has been theoretically verified
in the next subsection.
C. Undetectability of Stealth Attacks to Event-Triggered Al-
gorithms [22]
Considering a theoretical state-space model under nominal
operating conditions of the entire plant involving both con-
verter and control dynamics in the presence of attacks, the
estimated states can be obtained as:
˙̂x = Ax̂ + Bua (11)
= Ax̂ + B[û + Wxattack] (12)
where ◦̂ denote the estimated projections of the concerned
variables. More details regarding the projection of these vari-
ables can be referred from [22]. It should be noted that the
initial conditions of (11) are acquired using the measured states
and inputs. Using the difference between (11) and the actual
states, an event-triggered error eevi in i
th agent ascertains any
disturbance from the steady-state operation by activating the
communication channels, only when the binary variable ρi is
triggered using:
ρi =
{
1, if eevi(t)(= x̂i(t)− xi(t)) ≥ Υ
0, else
(13)
where Υ is an activation threshold. To align the control scheme
effectively, a full state feedback is employed to update the
inputs with respect to the states using:
û = −Kx̂ (14)
where K is the feedback matrix. Substituting (14) in (12), we
obtain the actual state-space model without external distur-
bances since the term Wxattack exhibits zero dynamics for
the modeled attack in (6), as per Remark II. Hence, it can
be concluded that stealth attacks can not be detected using
event-triggered control mechanisms.
To provide a clear understanding, a case study is carried out
in a DC microgrid with N = 4 agents in Fig. 2 to demonstrate
that stealth attacks can not be detected using the event-
triggered control mechanism for DC microgrids proposed in
[22]. Firstly, a balanced set of attack elements {-15, 0, 15, 0}
V are injected into the voltage control inputs in Fig. 2 as per
the attack model in [14]. After the attack is initiated, it can
be seen that the average voltage estimates return back to the
global voltage reference of 315 V. At t = 3 sec, an increase
in load is introduced to highlight identical dynamics and
convergence, which makes it difficult to distinguish between
physical disturbances and stealth attack. Further, a stealth
attack of 4 A is conducted on the current sensor and outgoing
communication links in unit II at t = 5 sec. However, it can be
seen in Fig. 2 that the resulting control input made using the
attacked sensors and other relevant quantities converge back
to zero for stealth attacks. As a result, the event-triggering
mechanism which gets activated in both the cases (at t =
1 & 3 sec) does not provide a direct manifestation into the
differentation between stealth attacks and other disturbances.
By maintaining this discretion, the attacker can launch a
critical attack by increasing the magnitude of the injected
attack elements, which activates the protective measures and
consequently leading to shutdown. As a consequence, this case
study necessitates the mitigation of stealth attacks using an
authentic resilient mechanism, such that aforementioned risks
can be prevented easily.
III. PROPOSED EVENT-DRIVEN RESILIENT CONTROL
STRATEGY
In this section, the detection philosophy alongwith the
proposed countermeasures to operate normally during both
steady-state and transient conditions in the presence of stealth
attacks is discussed in detail.
A. Detection
The detection strategies for both the stealth attacks in
Table I, have been provided in Table II. More details on its
formulation can be referred from [14] and [15]. Upon detection
of attack elements, it is vital to remove these attacks as such
unbounded signals in the control system may quickly trigger
(8)-(9), ultimately leading to system shutdown. It should be
noted that the aforementioned detection criteria will perform
satisfactorily, even under the presence of uncoordinated at-
tacks. By definition, uncoordinated attacks can be defined as
a set of attack elements, which do not follow synchronization
theory in Wxattack 6= 0. As a consequence, it follows from
(6) to conclude that LTua 6= 0 for uncoordinated attacks.
Remark III: Using (13), it can be formalized that the set of
detection criterion DM i = {DM i1, DM i2} in Table II can
be defined as events, when they start operating outside the
detection threshold Υ = {Υ1,Υ2}, respectively.
It is worth notifying that the detection thresholds are in-
finitesimal values, which are designed to disregard measure-
ment noise to ensure accurate detection. As the detection
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Fig. 3. Proposed event-driven resilient control strategy to mitigate stealth attacks [14], [15] in DC microgrids with N agents.
TABLE II
DETECTION CRITERIA FOR STEALTH ATTACKS IN TABLE I
Stealth Attack Detection Criteria for ith Agent Terminology
Voltage [14]
hi
1[
∑
jεMi
aij(∆V1j − ∆V1i )]
[
∑
jεMi
aij(∆V1j + ∆V1i )] > Υ1
DM i1
Current [15]
ci[
∑
jεMi
aij(I
j
inref
− Iiinref )]
[
∑
jεMi
aij(I
j
inref
+ Iiinref )] > Υ2
2 DM i2
1 hi is a positive quantity used for ith agent.
2 ci, Iiinref denote a positive quantity and the input current reference for
ith agent.
criterion monitors (as shown in Fig. 3) reveal the compromised
section in each agent, an authentication signal Ωi is generated
for the particular counterpart (voltage/current) in ith agent.
It should be noted that the nature of authentication signal is
binary, such that:
Ωi =
{
0(F), if DM i ≤ Υ
1(T), else
(15)
Further, as shown in Fig. 3, a set of authentication signals
from the neighboring agents Ci = {Ωj |j ∈ Mi} are also
communicated to ith agent. To simplify the representation
of authentication for any signal, ◦T and ◦F will be used to
symbolize True and False for local/communicated mea-
surements, respectively using (15).
B. Mitigation
As long as the event(s) hold true, the control variables used
in designing DM i are forced to follow the trajectories of non-
compromised neighboring signals (with Ωj labeled as True).
As highlighted in Fig. 3, if the set of authentication signals in
ith agent Ci is not a zero vector in the presence of attack
elements, event-driven resilient signals are reconstructed to
mitigate stealth attacks in Table I by using:
∆V1i(tk) = Ξ1(∆V
T
1j (t)) (16)
Idci(tk) = Ξ2(I
T
dcj (t)) (17)
where, ◦(tk) (with k as the triggering instant) denote the
event-triggered samples of the respective signals generated
TABLE III
TRIGGERING CRITERIA FOR STEALTH ATTACKS IN TABLE I
Stealth Attack Triggering Criteria for ith Agent
Triggering
Function
Voltage [14] L∆Va1 ≤ Υ1 1 Ξ1
Current [15] L∆Iainref ≤ Υ1
2 Ξ2
1 ∆Va1 denote vector representation of ∆V1i with attack elements.
2 Iainref denote vector representation of I
i
inref
with attack ele-
ments.
when the triggering criterion in Table III is activated during
stealth attacks. It is worth notifying that Ξ(◦) in (16)-(17) is
a triggering function, which holds the input signal ◦ until the
next instant of triggering. However, if Ci is a null vector,
this implies that all the communicated measurements are
compromised with attack elements and should be prevented
from being used in ith agent. Hence, this leads to localized
operation of ith agent (as highlighted in Fig. 3). Finally,
Fig. 4. Peformance of event-driven resilient mechanism for a stealth attack
on Idc2 (t) at t = 0.5 sec (in the considered system in Fig. 1 with N = 4
agents) with the resilient signal reconstructed using ITdc3 (t).
this action is completed by susbstituting the event-driven
resilient signals with the attacked signal based on the local
authentication signal using:
∆V1i(t) = Ω1∆V1i(t) + (1− Ωi)∆V1i(tk) (18)
Idci(t) = ΩiIdci(t) + (1− Ωi)Idci(tk) (19)
Finally, the signals obtained in (18) and (19) are substituted
into (4) and (1) respectively to realize the mitigation of
stealth attacks in DC microgrids. This philosophy exploits the
basic theory of consensus law in (1) where all the participat-
ing elements are identical. Further, this philosophy not only
mitigates the attacks but allows to operate normally under
external disturbances such as load change, communication
delay, etc. To prove its robustness in the presence of external
disturbances, a case study is carried out for the considered
system in Fig. 1 with N = 4 agents following a ring based
cyber topology, where a stealth attack is injected into Idc2 at t
= 0.5 sec. As soon as the attack is launched, (19) is activated
prior to detection of events in sublayer II of agent II in Fig. 3.
Upon signal reconstruction of event-driven apriori using ITdc3 ,
it can be seen in Fig. 4 that the error convergence is held to
zero owing to every triggering instants in Table III. Further, its
performance aligns perfectly for external disturbances, such as
load change at t = 1 sec, thereby obeying (5).
Theorem 1: Apart from mitigating attacks, the proposed
event-driven resilient strategy is also robust to operate under
both steady-state and dynamic conditions.
To provide a theoretical justification of its performance
under any disturbances, a convergence analysis is carried out
in the next section.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED
RESILIENT STRATEGY
In this section, the convergence analysis of event-driven
resilient signals with periodic time-triggered signals will be
theoretically verified to establish its performance for worse
attack scenarios when all the agents are compromised. It is
worth notifying that the resilient approach involves triggering
of ∆V i1 (control input) for stealth voltage attacks and Idci
(state) for stealth current attacks. As a result, the state-
input relationship limits detection capability of the proposed
controller for full-scale attacks in the case of voltages and
currents. Since control inputs can be redesigned using the
states in (14), it is viable to guarantee full scale resiliency
in case of stealth voltage attacks, however one trustworthy
node will always be required to provide resilient operation
for stealth current attacks. More details regarding full-scale
resilient control systems can be referred from [28].
Considering the sampled measurements using the triggering
criterion in Table III as:
Λ̂i(k) = Λi(tk) (20)
for k ∈ [tk, tk+1] with Λi = {∆V1i , Idci}. Define
zi(tk) = Λ̂i(tk)−
1
Mi
∑
j ε Mi
ΛTj (t) ∀i ∈ N (21)
Let tik, ∀k = 1, 2,... denote the triggering instants in ith
agent and also broadcasted to the neighbors j ∈ Mi. Hence,
the sampled control input is a piecewise constant function in
which ûi(k) = ui(tMik ) for k ∈ [t
Mi
k , t
Mi
k+1). Given an initial
condition Λ(0), the iteration from event-triggered algorithm
for ith agent will provide:
Λi(k + 1) = Λi(k) + γiui(k) (22)
where γi denotes the step length. Considering a Lyapunov
candidate V (Λ(k)) = f(Λ(k)) - f(Λ̂(k)) for the system in
(22). Hence, it is trivial to derive from (21)-(22) that ∆V (Λ) =
∆f(Λ). For all k ≥ 0, we have
∆V ≤
N∑
i=1
{γiui[
∑
j∈Mi
(Λj − Λ̂j)− ui] +
N
2
γ2i u
2
i } (23)
Using Young’s inequality xy < x
2
2ε +
εy2
2 with ε denoting an
infinitesimal value, we get
∆V ≤
N∑
i=1
{−γi(1−
εi
2
− N
2
γi)u
2
i +
γi
2εi
[
∑
jεMi
(Λj − Λ̂i)]2}. (24)
Since there are Mi terms in
∑
jεMi
(Λj − Λ̂i), and further
using the sum of squares inequality, we get
[
∑
jεMi
(Λj − Λ̂i)]2 ≤ |Ni|
∑
jεMi
(Λj − Λ̂i)2. (25)
Substituting (25) in (24), we get
∆V ≤
N∑
i=1
[−γi(1−
εi
2
− N
2
γi)z
2
1 +
γi|Mi|
2εi
∑
jεMi
(Λj − Λ̂i)2]. (26)
Re-arranging the last term of (26), we get:
∆V ≤
N∑
i=1
[−γi(1−
εi
2
− N
2
γi)u
2
1 +
N∑
j=1
(Λj − Λ̂i)2
∑
i∈N
Γi|Mi|
2εi
. (27)
Since the attack detection event instants in ith agent are
determined by
u2i (k) = ρiû
2
i (k) (28)
(Λj(k)− Λ̂i(k))2 ≤
∑
i∈N
ρiγi
Mi
(1− εi2 −
N
2 γi)û
2
i∑
i∈N
γiMi
2εi
, (29)
adding and subtracting
∑N
i=1 ρiγi(1−
εi
2 −
N
2 γi)û
2
i , we obtain
∆V ≤ −
N∑
i=1
γi(1−
N
2
− εi
2
)(u2i − ρiû2i )
+
N∑
i=1
[(Λj − Λ̂i)2
∑
i∈Nj
γi|Mi|
2εi
(1− εi
2
− N
2
γi)û
2
i ]
(30)
Theorem 2: ∆V (Λ) ≤ 0 is guaranteed for all k using (28)-(30)
for any i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi. The only scenario where ∆V =
0 can happen is when
ui = ûi = 0 ∀i ∈ N
Λi = Λ̂i = 0 ∀j ∈Mi.
(31)
Theorem 3: Using (31), it has been proved that Λ̂i(k) is
asymptotically stable and converges to the periodic time-
triggered signals.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed event-driven resilient control strategy is tested
on cyber-physical DC microgrid, as shown in Fig. 1 with N=
4 agents for a global reference of 315 V. Each agent of equal
power capacities comprising of a DC source and DC/DC buck
converter, operate to maintain an output voltage for a local
reference V idcref at their respective buses. Firstly, a sensitivity
analysis to study the performance of the proposed strategy for
different detection thresholds Υ is studied alongwith a study
on variation of settling time of the attacked signals. Next,
its performance validation for multiple stealth attacks under
scenarios such as plugging out of converters, communication
delay is carried out to verify the robustness of the event-
driven signal reconstrunction based attack mitigation strategy.
Moreover, it has been thoroughly verified in case studies that
only attacks qualify as events to accommodate the resilience
of DC microgrids. The simulated plant and control parameters
are provided in Appendix.
(b)
(a)
Fig. 5. Sensitivity analysis of the proposed event-driven attack resilient
mechanism in the considered system under the presence of stealth: (a) voltage,
and (b) current attack on agent III for different values of Υ1 and Υ2
respectively.
Fig. 6. Variation of settling time Tsettling of the control input signals ua
in the considered system for different magnitude of attack elements xattack
and respective triggering thresholds Υ.
A sensitivity analysis is carried out for the considered
system to inspect the detection capability of the proposed
strategy in Fig. 5 for different values of Υ. A stealth voltage
Fig. 7. Performance of the proposed event-driven attack resilient controller in
the presence of stealth voltage and current attacks in Fig. 2 – It only detects
attacks as events and mitigates it using the triggering criteria immediately.
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Fig. 8. Performance of the proposed event-driven attack resilient controller
in the presence of stealth voltage and current attacks in multiple agents
with agent II plugged out at t = 4 sec – resiliency is always achieved with
authentication signal for agent III immediately switched from Ω2 to Ω4 when
agent II is plugged out.
attack is performed at t = 0.3 sec on agent III, as shown
in Fig. 5(a). As soon as the attack is launched, it can be
seen that with increase in the value of Υ1, the transient peak
and the settling time to the optimal setpoint keeps increasing.
A similar performance can be observed for stealth current
attack for different values of Υ2 in Fig. 5(b). Moreover, to
provide resiliency against input and acquisition noise, Υ can
be adjudged as small as possible, yet sufficiently larger than
the measurement noise to avoid unnecessary triggering. Hence,
Fig. 9. Performance of the proposed event-driven attack resilient controller
in the presence of multiple stealth current attacks on agent II and III at t = 1
and 2.5 sec under a maximum communication delay of 125 ms – the settling
time increases due to delayed authentication updates from neighbors.
the design of Υ is a deterministic task for each system,
which highly affects factors such as accuracy and dynamic
response. To simplify this task, the variance of noise in the
measurements for a given system can be used as a good
indicator to decide the minimum value of Υ in advance.
To encompass the relationship between triggering thresholds
for different magnitude of attack elements and its physical
impact, a case study is carried out in Fig. 6 to variation of
settling time Tsettling of the attacked control inputs. It can
be seen that with increase in the magnitude of xattack and
Υ, Tsettling follows an increasing trend for both voltage and
current attacks. It should be noted that the consideration of
xattack in Fig. 6 is limited to the respective upper and lower
limits in (8)-(9). Moreover, better noise filtering capabilities of
secondary sublayer II allows a lower value of Υ2 as compared
to Υ1 to design the proposed event-driven resilient strategy.
Next, the performance of the event-driven resilient con-
troller is compared to the case study for conventional event-
triggering method (studied in Fig. 3) in Fig. 7. As it can
be seen in Fig. 7, the stealth voltage attack is successfully
determined as event at t = 1 sec, which triggers the signal
reconstruction of ∆V11(tk) and ∆V13(tk), such that the trig-
gered DM1 remains within the detection threshold. However
for an increase in load at t = 3 sec, the proposed controller
do not detect any events; which justify its robustness to
differentiate between physical disturbances and cyber attacks.
Further at t = 5 sec, a stealth current attack is launched on
agent II, which led to increase in current from each agent, as
studied previously in Fig. 2. However, the proposed resilient
controller ensures that the currents from each agents continue
to operate at the same loading level as Idc2(tk) is reconstructed
to follow consensus using the proposed mitigation strategy.
In the next case study, the performance of the proposed re-
silient controller is tested for instances when the authentication
signal is switched from one agent to another. It can be seen
in Fig. 8 that a stealth curent attack is conducted on agent III
at t = 1 sec, which triggers the mitigation philosophy as C3 is
not a null vector. This implies that all the neighbors of agent
III are transmitting True measurements. It is worth notifying
that the selection of authentication signal from the set Ci is
not governed by any priority labels. Using this hypothesis,
agent II signals with authenticity labeled as Ω2 = T is
activated immediately for signal reconstruction of Idc3(tk).
Following up to monitor its performance to regard consensus
during external disturbances, it can be seen in Fig. 8 that the
event-driven resilient signal Idc3(tk) still follows proportionate
current sharing. However when agent II is plugged out at t =
4 sec, the outgoing communication links are disabled which
restricts the transmission of signals to any of its neighbors.
Consequently, agent III immediately switches from Ω2 to Ω4
for reconstruction of Idc3(tk) such that the remaining active
agents share the load current equally. Moreover, when stealth
current attack II and III of magnitude 6 and 24 A is launched
on agent I and III at t = 5 and 6 sec respectively, it can be
seen that the sharing accuracy and consensus between agents
is unlatered despite the magnitude of attack.
In the final case study, the performance of the proposed
resilient controller is tested for multiple stealth current attacks
under a maximum network communication delay of 125 ms
in Fig. 9. At first, when a stealth current attack is launched
on agent III at t = 1 sec; the attacked signal causes a
momentary increase with the transient being eliminated as
the authentication signal Ω2 = T is reached after a delay of
125 ms to update the event-driven signal Idc3(tk) using (19).
As this hypothesis is well-studied previously, the settling time
intuitatively increases to 0.1 sec for a value of Υ2 = 0.01.
Further at t = 2.5 sec, a stealth current attack is launched on
agent II which creates a momentary increase and settles down
as the resilient update of Idc2(tk) is received after a delay of
125 ms using Ω1 = T. The robustness of the proposed con-
troller can be ensured via a load change at t = 3 sec, when the
currents from each agent are proportionately shared. Further,
the discretized values from every triggering instant is zoomed
in to show the trajectory which they follow during steady-state
and dynamic conditions. Hence, the proposed event-driven
resilient scheme is not limited to mitigating attacks for steady-
state operation of converter(s), but is also flexible to operate
for dynamic conditions such as load changes.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed detection strategy has been experimentally
validated in a DC microgrid operating at a voltage reference
Vdcref of 48 V with N = 2 buck converters, as shown in Fig.
10. A single line diagram of the experimental setup is also
shown in Fig. 11. Both the converters are tied radially to a
programmable load (voltage-dependent mode). Each converter
is controlled by dSPACE MicroLabBox DS1202 (target), with
control commands from the ControlDesk from the PC (host).
Using the local and neighboring measurements, the proposed
event-driven resilient strategy shown in Fig. 3 is modeled for
every converter to mitigate the attacks and meet the control
objectives in (5). The experimental testbed parameters are
provided in Appendix.
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Fig. 10. Experimental setup of a cooperative DC microgrid comprising of N
= 2 agents controlled by dSPACE MicroLabBox DS1202 supplying power to
the programmable load.
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Fig. 11. Single line diagram of the experimental setup shown in Fig. 10.
In Fig. 12(a), stealth voltage attacks is launched by injecting
attack elements of ± 8 V on both agents. As a result, the
secondary sublayer I output is displaced by equal quanti-
ties thereby activating the mitigation criteria to trigger these
outputs to zero. Even though both the agents are attacked,
since the detection rule is local DM1 goes positive, which
will essentially trigger the respective mitigation criteria. As a
result, it can be seen in Fig. 12(a) that as soon as the attack
is launched, the currents and voltages return back to the pre-
attack instant values following a transient. A zoomed picture
is also highlighted to establish that consensus is achieved
between the states. Further in Fig. 12(b), two stealth current
attacks on agent I is carried out with xIattack1 = 4 and 24
A (highlighted as event A and B respectively in Fig. 12) are
launched. It can be seen in Fig. 12(b) that as soon as the
attack is launched, the authentication signal from both agents
is cross-verified as soon as the detection criteria suggests
the presence of an attack. Since Ω2 = T in this case, the
reconstructed resilient signal Idc1(tk) is designed such that
consensus holds true. Intuitively, the settling time and peak
value of the transients prior to the attack in Fig. 12(b) increases
with the magnitude of attack element. Finally in Fig. 12(c),
when stealth current attack is launched on both the agents
at the same time, since the detection philosophy is dependent
on transmitted sensor measurements, the authentication signals
from both converters will traverse to F. As a result, the
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Fig. 12. Experimental validation of the proposed resilient controller for : (a)
stealth voltage attack on all agents, (b) two stealth current attacks on agent I
(During events A and B, xIattack1 = 4 and 24 A is injected into agent I), (c)
stealth current attacks on gent I and II simultaneously.
system immediately runs into l cal operation as described
in Fig. 3. Finally, when the attack element in agent II is
removed, it can be seen that the system returns back to
the normal operating condition following consensus theory
using the proposed event-driven mitigation strategy. Hence,
this validates the effectiveness of the performance of proposed
resilient controller to full scale attacks for voltages and (N−1)
scale attacks for currents (at least one trusted agent will always
be required to broadcast True signals).
VII. DISCUSSION
The core idea of the proposed resilience mechanism is
to substitute the compromised signal with an event-driven
resilient signal constructed using trustworthy measurements
from neighbors. The robustness of its operation has been tested
for many scenarios, which has been tabulated in Table IV.
In Table IV, it can be seen that the proposed event-driven
resilient scheme is also robust to other anomlaies such as line-
to-line faults and sensor faults, where the dynamic response are
TABLE IV
EFFECTIVENESS OF EVENT-DRIVEN RESILIENT STRATEGY
Disturbances Performance
Load change/line outage !
Stealth attack on voltages & currents !
Attack under max. communication delay !
Sensor fault DM i < Υ1
Converter outage under attack !
Line-to-line fault DM i < Υ2
1 A fault detection metric FDiI is proposed in [16] to dif-
ferentiate between current sensor faults and cyber attacks.
2 A line-to-line fault evaluation theory is proposed in [15]
to differentiate between line faults and cyber attacks.
quite identical to cyber attacks. However, since the detection
criteria DM i doesn’t exceed the detection threshold Υ for
these disturbances, the event-driven mitigation process will
not be activated. More details on detection of line-to-line and
sensor faults and their differentiation with cyber attacks have
been provided in [15] and [16], respectively. Finally, the main
features of the proposed event-driven resilient scheme are:
1) It ensures N − 1 and full scale of resilience for stealth
attacks on currents and voltages, respectively.
2) It has no model-intensive requirements and scalable to N
units.
3) It provides flexibility to maintain resilience against cyber
attacks without disabling any cyber links.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented an event-driven resilient con-
trol scheme to detect two categories of stealth attacks, i.e.
on voltage and current measurements in cyber-physical DC
microgrids. Since such attacks can impose risk on critical
infrastructure, it is vital to remove these attacks in a timely
manner in power electronics intensive systems. Adopting a
new philosophy by emphasizing cyber attacks as events, this
paper detects the attacks locally and transmit the authenti-
cation signal (Ωi = T/F) of measurements to the neighboring
measurements. As a result, the rest of the agents re-orient their
operation and assist the attacked agent to reconstruct an event-
driven signal using their autheticated measurements. Since the
basic philosophy of consensus theory complies with identi-
cal arrangements, this concept has been exploited to design
the proposed controller. Theoretical analysis and simulations
under different instances are carried out to establish that the
proposed controller is robust to many physical disturbances
and provides a good manifestation to trigger only during cyber
attacks. Moreover, the full-scale resiliency is widely discussed
and the prophecies are validated in the experimental prototype.
This strategy is also applicable for uncoordinated attacks and
will be highly applicable for mission-critical application such
as naval ships and electric aircrafts where security is a prime
concern. As a future scope of work, this philosophy will
be extended for heterogeneous system dynamics, wherein the
system objectives will be different for grid-forming and grid-
following applications of microgrids. Further studies will be
conducted on the proposed scheme to extend the scope of
resiliency against cyber attacks in AC microgrids. Moreover,
further focus on exchange of authenticity signatures needs to
be studied in detail with the possibility of a man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack.
APPENDIX
Simulation Parameters
The considered system consists of four sources rated equally
for 6 kW. It is to be noted that the line parameter Rij is
connected from ith agent to jth agent. Moreover, the controller
gains are identical for each agent.
Plant: R12 = 1.8 Ω, R14 = 1.3 Ω, R23 = 2.3 Ω, R43 = 2.1 Ω
Converter: Lsei= 3 mH, Cdci= 250 µF, Idcmin = 0 A, Idcmax
= 18 A, Vdcmin = 270 V, Vdcmax = 360 V.
Controller: Vdcref = 315 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 3, K
H1
I = 0.01,
KH2P = 4.5, K
H2
I = 0.32, GV P = 2.8, GV I = 12.8, GCP =
0.56, GCI = 21.8, Vin = 270 V, h = 1.2, c = 2.1, Υ1 = 0.02,
Υ2 = 0.015.
Experimental Testbed Parameters
The considered system consists of two sources with the
converters rated equally for 600 W. It should be noted that
the controller gains are consistent for each converter.
Plant: R1 = 0.9 Ω, R2 = 1.2 Ω
Converter: Lsei= 3 mH, Cdci= 100 µF
Controller: Vdcref = 48 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 1.92, K
H1
I =
15, KH2P = 4.5, K
H2
I = 0.08, g = 0.64, h = 1.5, c = 1.4, Υ1
= 0.025, Υ2 = 0.035.
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Tomislav Dragičević (S’09-M’13-SM’17) received
the M.Sc. and the industrial Ph.D. degrees in Elec-
trical Engineering from the Faculty of Electrical
Engineering, Zagreb, Croatia, in 2009 and 2013,
respectively. From 2013 until 2016 he has been a
Postdoctoral research associate at Aalborg Univer-
sity, Denmark. From 2016 until 2020, he was an
Associate Professor at Aalborg University, Denmark.
From 2020, he is a professor at the Technical Uni-
versity of Denmark.
He made a guest professor stay at Nottingham
University, UK during spring/summer of 2018. His principal field of interest
is design and control of microgrids, and application of advanced modeling
and control concepts to power electronic systems. He has authored and co-
authored more than 200 technical papers (more than 100 of them are published
in international journals, mostly in IEEE), 8 book chapters and a book in the
field.
He serves as Associate Editor in the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUS-
TRIAL ELECTRONICS, in IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER ELEC-
TRONICS, in IEEE Journal of Emerging and Selected Topics in Power
Electronics and in IEEE Industrial Electronics Magazine. Dr. Dragičević is a
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